. The creation of a single global super-regulator of ®nancial markets and institutions (Henry Kaufman).
. The creation of a world central bank with responsibility for overseeing a new global currency (Jeffrey Garten).
. The selection of the IMF to perform the functions of a lender of last resort, a suggestion packaged along with a wide range of improvements to the existing structure of the international ®nancial institutions (IFIs) (Stanley Fischer).
The Council on Foreign Relations created a task force (of which the author was a member) and recently published its ®ndings in a report entitled `Safeguarding Prosperity in a Global Financial System: The Future International Financial Architecture', which put forward seven key recommendations:
. The IMF should lend on more favourable terms to countries that take effective steps to reduce their crisis vulnerability, and should publish an assessment of these steps so that the market can take note.
. Emerging economies with fragile ®nancial systems should take transparent and non-discriminatory tax measures to discourage short-term capital in¯ows.
. The private sector should promote fair burden sharing and market discipline.
. Emerging economies should reject pegged exchange rates. . The IMF should adhere consistently to normal lending limits and abandon huge rescue packages.
. The IMF and the World Bank should revert to their basic historical roles. . Political support for ®nancial reform should be generated.
Most of these schemes have fatal ¯aws. Some suggestions, ranging from the unrealistic to the surreal, are politically infeasible given the absence of a supranational legal authority; some could substantially increase costs to lenders or add protection for borrowers, and thus would lead to a sharp contraction of capital ¯ows to developing nations; and those that shift risk away from creditors, thus leading to an increase in capital ¯ows, are likely to be followed by a wave of greater risk taking, followed by another wave of defaults.
It seems to me that all these suggestions possess bits that could be recalibrated and, if taken together, would be helpful in designing solutions. However any attempt to ®nd a sweeping one-size-®ts-all answer is bound to fail. After all, each situation is different and needs to be evaluated in light of its particular circumstances.
In my view solutions must be designed on a case-by-case basis, combined with smaller packages from the IFIs and accompanied by a reduction of bailout expectations (the moral hazard issue); more private sector involvement early on with terms that incentivise the private sector to participate; the recognition
